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POLICE STORIES
Helen A. Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
Most fact statements in judicial opinions do not read like a novel, but
there is the occasional exception. In Pennsylvania v. Dunlap,1 Chief Justice
Roberts opened his dissent from denial of certiorari as follows:
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force, was
working the morning shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood?
Tough as a three-dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five years on the beat, nine
months with the Strike Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the
neighborhood.
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. Another approached. Quick
exchange of words. Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each man
then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the guy wasn’t buying bus
tokens. He radioed a description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer. Sure
enough: three bags of crack in the guy’s pocket. Head downtown and book
him. Just another day at the office.2

This dissent, a flamboyant example of how judges present a police
narrative,3 garnered a lot of attention for its novelistic flair.4 Chief Justice
Roberts used his hard-boiled detective narrative to support the argument
that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant.5 Usually such judicial
narratives are presented in more mundane language, but with a similar
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1
555 U.S. 964 (2008) (denying petition for a writ of certiorari) [https://perma.cc/7JRB-W3F6].
2
Id. at 964 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).
3
“Police narrative” is actually a term of art and refers to the officer’s written report. Guides exist
on how to write these police narratives, with advice to avoid jargon and use plain English. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL BIGGS, JUST THE FACTS: INVESTIGATIVE REPORT WRITING (4th ed. 2012); A.S. MICHAEL,
THE BEST POLICE REPORT WRITING BOOK (2008); How to Write a Police Report, WIKIHOW,
http://www.wikihow.com/Write-a-Police-Report (last visited July 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/V8KS4EJ2]. Here, I use the term more broadly to mean the story told by or for police about a police-citizen
encounter.
4
See, e.g., From the Chief Justice, A Novel Dissent, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101402818.html
[https://perma.cc/CN9L-M69W]; Bill Mears, Chief Justice Roberts Shows His Writing Chops, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/14/roberts.mystery.writer/index.html?iref=24hours (last updated
Oct. 14, 2008, 4:19 PM) [https://perma.cc/6D84-52M2]; Martha Neil, Chief Justice Roberts Depicts a
Hard-Boiled Detective in ‘Three-Dollar Steak’ ’Hood, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 14, 2008, 8:57 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_depicts_a_hard_boiled_detective_in_thr
ee_dollar_steak/ [https://perma.cc/9RPX-FC36].
5
Dunlap, 555 U.S. at 964.
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purpose: to justify police action.6
Tellingly, Chief Justice Roberts employs a genre from a bygone era, a
genre that depicted white law enforcement and white (albeit perhaps not
Anglo-Saxon) criminals, to tell a story about modern North Philadelphia,
an area with a predominantly minority population.7 While the court
decisions in this case do not mention Dunlap’s race, there is a very good
chance that he is not white. To the extent the Chief Justice is supporting
police discretion in policing minority neighborhoods, he camouflages that
support with his white Sam Spade story.
The Dunlap dissent is perhaps the most obvious expression of the link
between popular culture and the narratives in judicial opinions. But the less
literary police narratives found in appellate opinions also tap into prevalent
cultural stories about the police—stories of hardworking, embattled
officers. Judicial writers use a variety of techniques to tell this police
narrative, including police language and “copspeak” (the vague and wordy
jargon we see in much police testimony).8 These stories also employ the
standard techniques of point of view, selective detail, quotes, and emphasis
to support the police version of events. The police narrative so dominates
the fact sections of judicial opinions in criminal cases that we have
difficulty imagining or crediting counter-narratives.
As lawyers and judges know, the facts, and the stories created with
those facts, make the law: “[A] case well stated is more than half argued.”9
The police narrative is one of the most common narratives in legal writing,
simply because there are so many criminal cases, as well as numerous civil
cases, involving police. For the most part, these narratives tell the familiar
6
For an example of more typical, mundane language, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thompson,
985 A.2d 928, 930 (Pa. 2009):

Officer Ortiz knew the neighborhood as a high crime area in which narcotics, and specifically
heroin, regularly were sold. The area was designated by the Philadelphia Police Department as
an “Operation Safe Streets” neighborhood. Officer Ortiz, a nine-year veteran of the police force,
and his partner, Officer Correa, were in plainclothes and driving an unmarked vehicle. Officer
Ortiz saw a car parked by the sidewalk and observed Appellant standing in the street by the
driver’s side door. Officer Ortiz watched Appellant hand the male driver some money and saw
the driver give Appellant a small object in return. Based on what he saw on the street and what
he knew, including the fact that he had made several hundred narcotics arrests of this very type,
Officer Ortiz believed the men were engaged in a drug transaction.
7
Based on 2010 Census numbers, the North Broad Street corridor area of North Philadelphia was
seventy-three percent African-American and twenty-one percent Hispanic. PHILA. RESEARCH
INITIATIVE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A CITY TRANSFORMED: THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHANGES IN
PHILADELPHIA
OVER
THE
LAST
20
YEARS
7
(2011),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/philadelphia_researc
h_initiative/philadelphiapopulationethnicchangespdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U3P-UAB8]; see also Kate
Kilpatrick, On Drug-Infested North Philly Corners, Hope and Good Luck Come in Bags, ALJAZEERA
AM. (Feb. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/2/17/on-drug-infested-northphilly-corners-hope-and-good-luck-come-in-a-bag.html (discussing long-standing drug problems in this
high-poverty neighborhood of mostly Puerto Rican residents) [https://perma.cc/9QHR-FTQF].
8
See Gibbons, infra note 39.
9
BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COURTS 524 (3d ed. 2014) (quoting Floyd E. Thompson, in SUCCESS IN COURT 267, 278
(Francis L. Wellman ed., 1941)).
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story of the hardworking, careful police officer in a challenging situation
with dangerous criminals. These narratives do much of the work of an
appellate argument, just as Chief Justice Robert’s story about Officer
Devlin makes the case that an experienced officer’s conclusion that he has
just seen a drug transaction deserves the Court’s deference. The story
drives the law.
Should we therefore be suspicious of these police narratives? No more
than we should read any legal narrative carefully, alert to what is being
emphasized and what is left out. But especially when a narrative taps into
common cultural stories, it can be difficult to imagine a different version,
let alone a different ending. The general shocked reaction of many white
Americans to the 2014 and 2015 videos of police shootings10 of unarmed
black men illustrates the strength of these cultural narratives, and the need
to question them. The videos suggested and gave credence to a counternarrative, in a way that verbal eyewitness testimony could not. What is true
for the public at large is also true for legal writers and readers.
Recent video recordings of police encounters with the public are not
the only reason to consider the power of the police narrative in judicial
writing. The exonerations of numerous wrongly convicted people over the
past several decades have also revealed the fallibility of the justice system,
and the danger of relying too readily upon police stories. As of this writing,
over 1,859 people have been exonerated since 1989.11 In many of these
cases, police accounts of the events turned out to be incomplete or even
untruthful.12
10

See Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes (last updated
Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM) (discussing how videos of police shootings are changing attitudes of citizens
who might otherwise have tended to believe police accounts) [https://perma.cc/CAD2-GFJ9]. In recent
weeks, videos have surfaced of police shootings of unarmed black men in Baton Rouge and
Minneapolis. See The Associated Press, A Look at Players in Philando Castile Police Shooting Case,
N.Y. T IMES (July 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/07/13/us/ap-us-police-shootingminnesota-whos-who.html [https://perma.cc/5TD9-BN3B]; Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling
Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Department Investigation, N.Y. T IMES (July 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/6S2W-ZGQ7]. These deaths sparked protests against police brutality and were
followed by the targeted killing of police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge. Richard Fausset et al.,
Online Trail Illuminates Baton Rouge Gunman’s Path to Violence, N.Y. T IMES (July 18, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/baton-rouge-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/J6DZ-NLVQ];
Patrick McGee et al., Snipers Kill 5 Dallas Officers at Protest Against Police Shootings, N.Y. T IMES
(July
7,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/dallas-police-officers-killed.html
[https://perma.cc/K7DQ-FVKQ]. It remains to be seen how these recent shootings will further affect the
general public’s views.
11
The
National
Registry
of
Exonerations,
UNIV.
OF
MICH.
LAW
SCH.,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx?View={b8342ae7-6520-4a32-8a064b326208baf8}&SortField=Exonerated&SortDir=Desc
(last
visited
Aug.
6,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/5TXB-VD2P]. 342 persons have been exonerated through DNA testing since 1989.
DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/dnaexonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited July 10, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZTT2-LSFE].
12
See Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causeswrongful-conviction/government-misconduct (last visited July 10, 2016) (discussing types of
governmental and police misconduct revealed during exonerations) [https://perma.cc/A3GA-4RDF];
see also Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law,
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The lesson from the videos and exonerations is not that police are
always wrong or that their stories should not be credited. Instead, the lesson
is that judges and law clerks should be aware of the power of the story, and
should seriously consider counter-narratives when they are presented. It is
important to understand that the fact section of an opinion is a story, and
that legal writers have a choice about whether and how to present the police
story.13
To be clear, in discussing writers’ choices in appellate fact statements,
I am not here challenging established standards of review or deference to
the finder of fact.14 Instead, I am examining how, even within these
constraints, stories can be told. Generally, appellate courts must defer to
trial court findings of credibility and what events occurred. Such deference,
however, does not fully constrain how those events are presented.
My purpose in this essay, then, is to show how particular police
narratives are retold in appellate decisions, and to demonstrate also the less
common alternative narratives. The essay proceeds as follows: I will first
describe briefly the police narrative we are familiar with from popular
culture—in particular, television dramas. Next, I will examine the police
narrative in appellate opinions. My review is anecdotal—I make no attempt
to quantify or exhaustively survey all opinions involving police. Finally, I
discuss examples of counter-narratives in judicial opinions, where people
who come in contact with police are humanized or where additional context
is introduced. I conclude that there is nothing wrong with telling the police
story, but trouble results when the telling is automatic or not justified.
Understanding the dominance of the popular heroic police narrative can
perhaps weaken its grip on the writer and reader’s imagination, and make
us less likely to automatically fit new facts into familiar patterns.

2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 95–97 (2005) (discussing police perjury and evidence fabrication as a contributor
to wrongful convictions).
13
The role of storytelling in legal argument has been discussed by many scholars. See, e.g., Helen
A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing Advice, 11 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 1, 9–15 (2010) (citing changing legal storytelling scholarship) [https://perma.cc/EBV28U3B]; Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 127, 130–31 (2008) (arguing for the importance of integrating the client’s story into a brief
instead of writing in a completely logical, legal manner) [https://perma.cc/T3XS-8A2V]; J. Christopher
Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 53
(2008) (“[S]torytelling lies at the heart of what lawyers do.”) [https://perma.cc/LNV5-3X6Y].
14
“Murky though the distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘law’ may be, there is general agreement that
somewhere along the fact-law spectrum lies a point beyond which appellate courts ought not venture.
Past it exist questions of ‘historical fact,’ the ‘who, when, what, and where’ series of questions that we
have deemed only juries or trial judges to be capable of answering.” Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate
Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 438–39 (2004)
(footnotes omitted) [https://perma.cc/2Z9R-27UM]. Oldfather presents a persuasive challenge to the
convention of factual deference.
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THE POLICE NARRATIVE: HARD-DRINKING HEROES AND SHREWD
DETECTIVES IN POPULAR CULTURE

“Police work is portrayed on television more often than any other
profession. It has been that way since the cowboys rode off into the television
sunset.”15

Television and movies may reflect collective shared narratives, rather
than cause them. But whether cause or effect, the popular narratives seen in
television and film are echoed in judicial fact statements and suggest a
trove of common stories that judicial writers tap into.
Books, movies, and television shows about police and crime-solving
have been popular for some time. The list of fictional detectives and police
officers is extensive. Arthur Conan Doyle, Agatha Christie, Raymond
Chandler, and others wrote popular fictional accounts of murder detectives
who were usually private citizens and gifted amateurs. More recently,
television series such as Blue Bloods,16 Law and Order,17 and CSI18 portray
the daily life of police officers.19 Whether these officers are “flawed” due to
excessive drinking,20 suffer from mental illness,21 or are unable to sustain
intimate relationships—or whether they are solid family men and
women22—the heroes of these shows are almost always dedicated
workaholics with good hearts and sound instincts. They are frequently
frustrated by the legal limitations on their authority to detain, search, and
question. The shows narrate sympathetically from the police point of view,
and the viewers cannot help but support the officers’ clever manipulation of
suspects who are trying to invoke their right to silence or an attorney.23
15

Bill Carter, Police Dramas on TV Were Always Popular; Now They’re Real, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/17/arts/police-dramas-on-tv-were-always-popular-nowthey-re-real.html [https://perma.cc/DBW6-G8KF].
16
(CBS).
17
(NBC).
18
(CBS).
19
For an alphabetical list of television police dramas, see List of Police Television Dramas,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_police_television_dramas (last visited July 7, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/3W5X-6G6G]. The popularity of police procedurals has even given rise to fear on the
part of prosecutors that jurors would have unrealistic expectations of real police crime labs and
investigations, although others dispute the basis for that fear of the “CSI effect.” See, e.g., Simon A.
Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in
Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (2009) (arguing evidence does not support the
phenomenon) [https://perma.cc/H9A3-RSM6]; Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt:
Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1052–53 (2006) (arguing that
the “CSI effect” has not been established by objective fact despite the phenomenon’s popularity in the
press) [https://perma.cc/UJ82-KHX6].
20
Examples abound of the hard-drinking detective, including Detective Andy Sipowicz of NYPD
Blue (ABC), Detectives Jimmy McNulty and Bunk Moreland on The Wire (HBO), or Detectives Marty
Hart and Rust Cohle on the first season of True Detective (HBO 2014).
21
The series Monk (USA Network) features a detective with obsessive-compulsive disorder, and
Homeland’s (Showtime) CIA agent Carrie Mathison has bipolar disorder.
22
The series Blue Bloods (CBS) is about a tight-knit Irish-American family of New York police.
23
Obviously, the shows range in quality and depth. Some have greater character development, as
well as moral and legal nuance. Yet even the most critically acclaimed crime dramas share the police
officer’s view of police–citizen encounters. Shows such as The Wire (HBO), or its predecessor
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Although much of the crime depicted is frightening, the inevitable
police victories are reassuring. There is the occasional story about the “bad
cop,” but in the television series, at least, these bad apples are ultimately
found and dealt with.24 These stories about the bad cop are the exceptions
that prove the rule. We are steeped in these images and stories. It is not
surprising, then, that these stories make their way into legal writing,
including appellate opinions.25
This is not to say that courts are deliberately inserting these popular
narratives into opinions. Rather, it is that judicial writers, like all of us, tend
to organize information into recognizable stories.26 A stock story, learned
either through experience or vicariously, “resolves ambiguity and
complements ‘given’ information with much ‘assumed’ information.”27 We
use known stories to make sense of a set of facts, filling in any gaps (or
even overriding discordant facts) with the stories.28 We make narrative
sense of known facts by fitting them to a story that seems plausible.
What “could” happen is determined, not by the decision makers’ undertaking
an empirical assessment of actual events, but rather by their looking to a
store of background knowledge about these kinds of narratives—to a set of
stock stories. The narrative is plausible, and persuasive, to the extent that it
bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock scripts or stories, not
to the extent that it “really happened.”29

Homicide: Life on the Street (NBC), still celebrate the line policemen and detectives and their battle
against crime, although they present a more complicated picture. For critical raves of The Wire, see Tim
Goodman, “Yes, HBO’s ‘Wire’ is Challenging. It’s Also a Masterpiece,” SFG ATE (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Yes-HBO-s-Wire-is-challenging-It-s-also-a-2553074.php
(arguing that The Wire is a masterpiece because of, and not in spite of, its dense narrative style)
[https://perma.cc/D9KW-FB2N]; Lorrie Moore, In the Life of “The Wire,” N.Y. R EV . OF B OOKS (Oct.
14, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/10/14/life-wire/ (praising The Wire’s novellike qualities as a “new art form”) [https://perma.cc/2Z9J-V5X6].
24
Only in the movies do the bad cops win or the good guys find themselves stymied by institutional
forces. See, e.g., SERPICO (Artists Entm’ts Complex, Inc. 1973); TRAINING DAY (Vill. Roadshow
Pictures 2001). Television depictions may be changing, however. See also Lisa Kern Griffin, Opinion,
“Making a Murderer” is About Justice, Not Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/opinion/making-a-murderer-is-about-justice-not-truth.html?_r=0
(discussing the Netflix series about a wrongful conviction as part of “popular culture’s” changing
“portrayal of the criminal justice system”) [https://perma.cc/MA5G-MP9X].
25
Of course there are also shows and stories that celebrate criminals; the bandit hero has always
existed. THE GODFATHER movies (Paramount Pictures 1972, 1974, 1990), Boardwalk Empire (HBO),
The Sopranos (HBO), Breaking Bad (AMC), and other shows and movies are also popular. But
although we may root for the rule-breakers in these shows, we do not see them as innocent victims of
police misbehavior. Thus, these shows do not really disturb the police narrative to the extent it depicts
police as generally in the right in police–citizen encounters.
26
JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990) (setting out a thesis that humans have an innate
“readiness” to organize experience into a narrative form).
27
Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (citing RICHARD NISBETT & LEE
ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 29 (1980)).
28
Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 266 (2009) (“Storytelling is said to be central to our ability to make sense out of a
series of chronological events otherwise lacking in coherence and consistency . . . .”) (footnotes
omitted) [https://perma.cc/Q8V3-G8AT].
29
Rideout, supra note 13, at 67.
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In addition, the fact that the police are usually found to be correct, and
defendants usually found to be guilty, creates a bias to seize on the “likely”
story.30 Thus, for example, in every search and seizure criminal case, the
stock police story is all the more appealing because the ending is already
known: the defendant was discovered to have contraband—the officer was
right!
The strength of these popular narratives is evidenced by the shocked
reaction to recent videos showing police shooting unarmed AfricanAmerican men.31 These videos were jarring, discordant, and qualified as
news precisely because they did not fit many white Americans’ ideas about
police behavior.32 What’s more, in most cases, there was an official police
account that the subsequent video belied—in other words, the actual police
narrative was revealed to be a fabrication.33 These videos will probably not
usher in a new era of judicial skepticism of police stories, but they have
introduced a counter-narrative of police aggression towards minorities—a

30
López, supra note 27, at 15 (“He judges frequency, probability and causality on the basis of the
most easily generated information.”) (footnote omitted). Indeed, it is our lightning-quick tendency to fill
in the facts with a stock story that is responsible for much of the problems caused by implicit bias—we
fill in a (biased) story to fit a character we have learned is African-American or Hispanic. See Anthony
G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945,
961–62 (2006) (discussing the concept and scientific basis for the theory of implicit bias)
[https://perma.cc/E4ND-45NV].
31
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32
My predominantly white 2015 criminal law students, although not a cross-section of the public,
were very shocked by the videos released that year. Reactions of the public at large may be divided
along racial lines. For example, some polls show whites believe the media over-hypes police shootings
of black men. See Most Voters Think Media Wrong on Race Shootings, Put Police at Risk, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS
(Mar.
18,
2015),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/march_2015/most_voters_th
ink_media_wrong_on_race_shootings_put_police_at_risk (“Eighty-two percent (82%) of black voters
think most black Americans receive unfair treatment from the police. White voters by a 56% to 30%
margin don’t believe that’s true.”) [https://perma.cc/Y4U6-XMEA]. But more recent polls show that the
videos surfacing in the past year have caused many whites, too, to believe police mistreat minorities.
See Ray Jablonski, Polls Find One Year after Ferguson Shooting, Race Relations Are Deteriorating,
CLEVELAND.COM,
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2015/08/polls_find_one_year_after_ferg.html (last updated
Aug. 9, 2015, 9:55 AM) (summarizing recent national polls on race and criminal justice)
[https://perma.cc/A7FX-LAA4].
33
See, e.g., The Associated Press, Cleveland Boy Tamir Rice Wasn’t Reaching for Pellet Gun:
Report, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cleveland-boy-tamir-riceshands-were-pocket-when-shot-report-n474906 (presenting expert analyses of video that contradicts
officers’ statements that shots were in self-defense) [https://perma.cc/4ZG5-U3FW]; Monica Davey,
Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/officers-statements-differ-from-video-in-death-of-laquanmcdonald.html?_r=1 (discussing how video contradicted officer accounts of police shooting)
[https://perma.cc/CJ7J-342R]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Ohio: Report Says Killing by Officer Was
Preventable, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/ohio-report-sayskilling-by-officer-was-preventable.html (discussing contradictions between officer’s body camera
footage and the officer’s statements about a shooting during a traffic stop) [https://perma.cc/B98U98VG]; Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder of Walter
Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-ischarged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html (reporting how newly released video contradicted
police officer’s statement that he shot in self-defense) [https://perma.cc/B573-AV4D].
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counter-narrative that police now contend with in the media, if not in
court.34
The recent videos also force us to confront squarely the issue of race
in the police stories. The early twentieth century fictional depictions of
police and criminals—the hard-boiled detective narrative that Chief Justice
Roberts tapped into in Dunlap—depicted white cops and robbers.35 More
recent television dramas and movies might be somewhat more integrated,
but African-American criminals are now familiar characters. Tests of
implicit bias show the continuing strength of an unconscious association of
criminality with blackness.36 The videos of police shootings underscore that
association and its consequences, as well as the existence of explicit bias.
Some officers have been charged as a result of video-recorded
incidents.37 But regardless of the ultimate outcome in these cases, the
videos, and the actual episodes they depict, show us a very different
narrative than we are accustomed to seeing in television dramas or court
decisions. The videos show actions that otherwise would seem implausible

34

See Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We All Just
Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2015) (recounting the 2014 “extensive media coverage of
police killings of unarmed Black men and boys, including Eric Garner, Michael Brown, John Crawford,
Tamir Rice, and Levar Jones”) (footnote omitted). It may be that the counter-narrative is gaining on the
default narrative of the brave, conscientious officer: “The release last month of ‘Making a Murderer,’ a
10-part documentary from Netflix, capped a year in which popular culture’s portrayal of the criminal
justice system seems to have shifted. Out with the old tropes about truth-seeking investigators and tidy
resolutions; in with the disquieting, dysfunctional reality of many courtrooms and police stations.”
Griffin, supra note 24.
35
For examples of the hard-boiled detective genre, see RAYMOND CHANDLER, T HE L ONG
G OODBYE (1953); DASHIELL HAMMETT, T HE M ALTESE F ALCON (1930). Such stories often included
ethnicities such as Irish- or Italian-American, ethnicities that today we consider simply white. Gangster
movies of the early twentieth century are good examples: THE P UBLIC E NEMY (Warner Bros. 1931)
includes Irish-American characters, as does A NGELS WITH D IRTY F ACES (Warner Bros. 1938).
S CARFACE (The Caddo Co. 1932) is about an Italian-American gangster. Famous gangsters from this
period include Al Capone and Charles “Lucky” Luciano, Italian-Americans.
36
See generally R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal
Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1182–83 (2006) (discussing the Implicit Association Test research
revealing unconscious associations between race and positive or negative attributes)
[https://perma.cc/DM37-LV5P]; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (investigating the influence of
stereotypic associations on visual processing in five studies, concluding “some associations between
social groups and concepts are bidirectional and operate as visual tuning devices”)
[https://perma.cc/D9A5-VDDQ]; Katherine N. Hallinan, A Deadly Response: Unconscious Racism and
California’s Provocative Act Doctrine, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 71, 86–87 (2010)
(discussing African-American criminal stereotypes).
37
Conor Friedersdorf, The Number of Cops Indicted for Murder Spikes Upward, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/the-shocking-number-of-copsrecently-indicted-for-murder/401732/ (noting indictments of officers in Cincinnati, South Carolina,
Baltimore, and elsewhere) [https://perma.cc/59XE-C7AW]. The New York Times has compiled an
account of the legal outcomes to date for the publicized police shootings of unarmed black men caught
on video over the past several years. Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in
Police-Involved
Deaths
of
Blacks,
N.Y.
T IMES ,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/12/us/looking-for-accountability-in-police-involveddeaths-of-blacks.html (last updated July 27, 2016) (including information about professional
ramifications, like firing and being put on leave, civil rights investigations, and settlement amounts in
each case) [https://perma.cc/QDH7-WPGU].
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to most nonminority citizens.38 The police narratives we are accustomed to
generally create a sense of the implausibility of police misconduct. This is
done is a variety of ways, as discussed below.
II. THE POLICE NARRATIVE IN APPELLATE OPINIONS
Although their stories may echo what we see in popular films and
television shows, appellate courts tell the facts of a case in words, not
video. They present the police narrative through choices about language,
perspective, selective details, and context. This section explores some of
the more common techniques.
One interesting way in which the police narrative makes its way into
appellate opinions is in the use of police language. Police language is
marked by at least two features, somewhat in tension: police slang and
overly formal—yet vague—official “copspeak.”39
The opacity of copspeak is frustrating to some judges. More than
thirty years ago, a judge commented with irritation on the way officers
testified:
The agents involved speak an almost impenetrable jargon. They do not get
into their cars; they enter official government vehicles. They do not get out
of or leave their cars, they exit them. They do not go somewhere; they
proceed. They do not go to a particular place; they proceed to its vicinity.
They do not watch or look; they surveille. They never see anything; they
observe it. No one tells them anything; they are advised. A person does not
tell them his name; he identifies himself. A person does not say something;
he indicates. They do not listen to a telephone conversation; they monitor it.
People telephoning to each other do not say “hello;” they exchange
greetings. An agent does not hand money to an informer to make a buy; he
advances previously recorded official government funds. To an agent, a list
of serial numbers does not list serial numbers, it depicts Federal Reserve
Notes. An agent does not say what an exhibit is; he says that it purports to
be. The agents preface answers to simple and direct questions with “to my
knowledge.”40

38
Gallup poll data from 2011 to 2014 showed that “Blacks in the U.S. have a significantly lower
level of confidence in the police as an institution than do whites,” noting that thirty-seven percent of
black adults have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police, compared to fifty-nine
percent of the white adults. Frank Newport, Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police,
GALLUP (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175088/gallup-review-black-white-attitudestoward-police.aspx [https://perma.cc/5GPF-2AUQ].
39
See JOHN GIBBONS, F ORENSIC L INGUISTICS : A N I NTRODUCTION TO L ANGUAGE IN THE
J USTICE S YSTEM 85–87 (2003) (discussing overly formal language and elaboration as a feature of
copspeak); Gwyneth Fox, A Comparison of ‘Policespeak’ and ‘Normalspeak’: A Preliminary Study, in
T ECHNIQUES OF D ESCRIPTION : S POKEN AND W RITTEN D ISCOURSE 183, 194 (John M. Sinclair et al.
eds.,1993) (“The prevailing tone of many police statements is pomposity, caused by too high a level of
formality.”).
40
United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973) [https://perma.cc/P2DP9T28]. The footnote continues: “They cannot describe a conversation by saying ‘he said’ and ‘I said;’
they speak in conclusions. Sometimes it takes the combined efforts of counsel and the judge to get them
to state who said what. Under cross-examination, they seem unable to give a direct answer to a
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Unlike this “almost impenetrable” copspeak, police slang can be
colorful and direct. The public becomes familiar (or believes it is familiar)
with some forms of police slang through police procedurals. Slang changes
over time, and may be peculiar to a geographic area, but there are
compilations of police slang.41 Police slang—as opposed to official
jargon—is not common in judicial opinions, although there is the
occasional quote.42 For example, Justice Scalia wrote in Scott v. Harris,43
describing a police chase:
Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in
slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit
vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott
decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision
Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle
to spin to a stop.” Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was
told to “‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’” Instead, Scott applied his push
bumper to the rear of respondent’s vehicle. As a result, respondent lost
control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment,
overturned, and crashed. Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a
quadriplegic.44

The quoted, “[g]o ahead and take him out,” is vivid slang that
contrasts strongly with the bland copspeak of the rest of the paragraph.
Phrases such as “precision intervention technique,” “terminate the
episode,” and “lead pursuit vehicle” conceal the exact action, and yet serve
to identify the writer and reader with the police, who presumably reported
the story with this language.45
While police slang appears occasionally in opinions, copspeak such as
that used in Scott v. Harris is fairly common in the fact sections of criminal
opinions. It is especially thick in unpublished decisions. In part, that may
be due to court caseloads and the fact that fairly inexperienced law clerks
are drafting a significant portion of unpublished opinions. It may also be
due to an uncritical adoption of the police and prosecutor’s version of
events.
A typical example:

question; they either spout conclusions or do not understand. This often gives the prosecutor, under the
guise of an objection, an opportunity to suggest an answer, which is then obligingly given.” Id.
41
See, e.g., GIBBONS, supra note 39, at 50–51; Law Enforcement Jargon, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_enforcement_jargon#United_States (last visited July 7, 2016) (listing
police initialisms, acronyms, and abbreviations) [https://perma.cc/37UV-SMST].
42
A search for “police jargon” in Westlaw retrieves numerous cases that give examples of police
slang terms. E.g., Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180, 191 (Pa. 2013) (“[T]he phrase ‘trash pull’ is
accepted police jargon, recognized by Pennsylvania jurisprudence as describing the investigation of
discarded trash.”) (emphasis omitted) [https://perma.cc/L5AB-VLLN].
43
550 U.S. 372, 375 (2007) [https://perma.cc/5FES-ELD4].
44
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
45
In addition, the final sentence of this quoted paragraph helps tell the police story by distancing
the reader from the gruesome consequences of police action. In contrast to the vivid immediacy of the
preceding sentence, this sentence uses the detached term “rendered” and the general term “injured.” Id.
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Eighteen months prior to trial, in connection with the investigation of
Marcellino’s murder, Detective Rosario, of the New York City Police
Department, interviewed an individual named Ray Jerez who was, at the
time, incarcerated. In that interview Jerez stated that, immediately after
the shooting, Mitchell told him that the shooter was an individual named
Nano.46
Another example:
An arrest and altercation ensued between the defendant and the officer,
after defendant had been stopped on the highway for operating his
automobile with defective equipment. At some point in the altercation, the
police officer received cuts on his hand.47

What makes this copspeak is the use of “individual named Ray Jerez”
instead of simply “Ray Jerez,” and “who was, at the time, incarcerated”
instead of “in prison [or jail].” Copspeak is formal and precise-sounding,
yet often actually vague. Words such as “altercation” obscure whether there
was a verbal argument, fistfight, or fight with weapons. “Authorization”
obscures whether the officer received verbal permission, from whom, and
what exactly was said, or whether there was a written order. “Determined”
masks how the officer figured something out.
Copspeak is easily mocked, even by police themselves.48 The fault for
this speech may not lie entirely with the police. Scholars have noted how
search and seizure law has developed in such a way as to encourage police
to use certain vague phrases to fit those used in the case law: phrases such
as “[f]urtive [m]ovements,” “high-crime area,” “training and experience.”49
But much copspeak seems intended to insulate police from criticism, or to
heighten impressions of police expertise and specialization. Thus, for
example, police do not shoot a person, they “discharge[] [their] weapon,
striking [an] individual.”50
Even when opinions are not written entirely in stilted copspeak (and
most of them are not), they may use details and phrases that clearly identify
the story as a police narrative. For example, the precise time and terms such
as “controlled purchase” and “on his person” in the following excerpt
suggest a police report:
About 2:50 p.m. on April 25, 2007, Senior Deputy Sheriff Victor Fazio of
the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department witnessed defendant Gregory Diaz
46

Hernandez v. Burge, 137 F. App’x 411, 413 (2d Cir. 2005).
State v. Allen, 427 A.2d 373, 373 (Vt. 1981) [https://perma.cc/64PQ-GMXM].
48
One officer offered a linguistics student the following example as parody: “He was hit by a
projectile from a high powered weapon, numerous times until his bodily functions ceased,” meaning he
was shot dead. GIBBONS, supra note 39, at 86.
49
Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 505 (2015) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) [https://perma.cc/X98J-J69K].
50
Peter Cox & Matt Sepic, Autopsy: Gunshot to Head Killed Jamar Clark in Mpls. Police
Shooting, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/11/17/51arrested-in-shooting-protest-that-blocked-i94 (quoting a Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
statement about the death of Jamar Clark) [https://perma.cc/XAL8-N3UL].
47
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participating in a police informant’s controlled purchase of Ecstasy.
Defendant drove the Ecstasy’s seller to the location of the sale, which then
took place in the backseat of the car defendant was driving. Immediately
after the sale, Fazio, who had listened in on the transaction through a
wireless transmitter the informant was wearing, stopped the car defendant
was driving and arrested defendant for being a coconspirator in the sale of
drugs. Six tabs of Ecstasy were seized in connection with the arrest, and a
small amount of marijuana was found in defendant’s pocket. Defendant had
a cell phone on his person.51

Copspeak has made its way into ordinary speech, in part thanks to
television police dramas as well as crime news.52 Journalists in a hurry
often report news in the copspeak given to them by police departments,
speaking of “alleged suspect[s]” and “active shooter[s].”53
But the police narrative is not dependent on copspeak or police slang.
Accomplished writers are able to present the police narrative in
straightforward, even compelling, language. Here, Chief Justice Roberts
describes a traffic stop:
Two men were in the car: Maynor Javier Vasquez sat behind the wheel, and
petitioner Nicholas Brady Heien lay across the rear seat. Sergeant Darisse
explained to Vasquez that as long as his license and registration checked out,
he would receive only a warning ticket for the broken brake light. A records
check revealed no problems with the documents, and Darisse gave Vasquez
the warning ticket. But Darisse had become suspicious during the course of
the stop—Vasquez appeared nervous, Heien remained lying down the entire
time, and the two gave inconsistent answers about their destination. Darisse
asked Vasquez if he would be willing to answer some questions. Vasquez
assented, and Darisse asked whether the men were transporting various types
of contraband. Told no, Darisse asked whether he could search the Escort.
Vasquez said he had no objection, but told Darisse he should ask Heien,
because Heien owned the car. Heien gave his consent, and Darisse, aided by
a fellow officer who had since arrived, began a thorough search of the
vehicle. In the side compartment of a duffle bag, Darisse found a sandwich
bag containing cocaine. The officers arrested both men.54

The absence of police jargon words such as “Hispanic male
individual” and the use of simple verbs such as “sat,” “lay,” and “owned”
make the story seem simple and straightforward. It is nevertheless a story
from the police point of view—the police narrative of events—that invites
us to identify with the officer. Thus it is the choice of details, point of view,
51

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011) [https://perma.cc/LV72-QWRY].
E.J. Dionne Jr., Best Way to Learn ‘Copspeak’ Is to Go on a ‘Ridealong’: We Love It, But Do We
Know What It Means?, NAT’L POST, May 22, 1999 (on file with author) (crediting the increased use of
copspeak to television dramas, newscasts, movies, and novels focused on crime).
53
See the list of overused copspeak phrases in the news noted by Dick Hilker, Opinion, Hilker: A
Scourge of Cop-Speak Copycats, DENVER POST, http://www.denverpost.com/2015/12/31/hilker-ascourge-of-cop-speak-copycats/ (last updated Apr. 19, 2016, 4:59 PM) [https://perma.cc/X3X3-BQPH].
54
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (citing the trial court opinion, 737 S.E.2d
351, 352–53 (2012)) [https://perma.cc/BY7M-EFTM].
52
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and choice of emphasis, rather than police jargon or copspeak, that conveys
the police narrative in this account.
III. COUNTER-NARRATIVES: THE SUSPECTS’ STORIES
What might a counter-narrative of police conduct look like? Counternarratives generally work by humanizing the persons who come into
contact with police, encouraging the reader to identify with them rather
than the police officers. More rarely, a counter-narrative might include
facts about police–community relations that can put an encounter in a very
different light. This additional context can radically change the story—just
as the dissemination of videos showing unprovoked police shootings can
radically change the context in which we assess police accounts of events.
This section explores these two aspects of a counter-narrative: humanizing
nonpolice subjects in police encounters and including context about police–
community relations.
An example of humanizing the suspects in a police encounter occurs
in Rodriguez v. United States,55 involving a traffic stop. In this search and
seizure case, the counter-narrative must overcome the inevitable ending in
which the officer is correct in his or her suspicions. This is the defense
challenge in all Fourth Amendment cases—to get the reader to see the
public interest in protecting a criminal suspect’s constitutional rights. In
Rodriguez, Justice Ginsburg meets this challenge by telling a story that
suggests an officer went too far in detaining the defendant during the stop.
She does this by inviting the reader to identify with the driver and
passenger, who are stopped only because an Officer Struble “observed a
Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of Nebraska State
Highway 275 for one or two seconds and then jerk back onto the road.”56
Struble approached the Mountaineer on the passenger’s side. After
Rodriguez [the driver] identified himself, Struble asked him why he had
driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to avoid a
pothole. Struble then gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of
insurance, and asked Rodriguez to accompany him to the patrol car.
Rodriguez asked if he was required to do so, and Struble answered that he
was not. Rodriguez decided to wait in his own vehicle.
After running a records check on Rodriguez, Struble returned to the
Mountaineer. Struble asked passenger Pollman for his driver’s license and
began to question him about where the two men were coming from and
where they were going. Pollman replied that they had traveled to Omaha,
Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was for sale and that they were
returning to Norfolk, Nebraska. Struble returned again to his patrol car,
where he completed a records check on Pollman, and called for a second

55
56

135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) [https://perma.cc/939R-DLK2].
Id. at 1612.
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officer. Struble then began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving
on the shoulder of the road.
Struble returned to Rodriguez’s vehicle a third time to issue the written
warning. By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished explaining the
warning to Rodriguez, and had given back to Rodriguez and Pollman the
documents obtained from them. As Struble later testified, at that point,
Rodriguez and Pollman “had all their documents back and a copy of the
written warning. I got all the reason[s] for the stop out of the way[,] . . . took
care of all the business.”
Nevertheless, Struble did not consider Rodriguez “free to leave.” Although
justification for the traffic stop was “out of the way,” Struble asked for
permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle. Rodriguez said no.
Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle,
and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer. Rodriguez
complied. At 12:33 a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived. Struble retrieved his dog
and led him twice around the Mountaineer. The dog alerted to the presence
of drugs halfway through Struble’s second pass. All told, seven or eight
minutes had elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until
the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a
large bag of methamphetamine.57

Although, like all search and seizure cases, the end of the story proves
the officer’s suspicions were correct, the story is told in a way that invites
the reader to identify with the driver and passenger—until the end. No
clues are given about why the officer detained the men longer than the stop
justified or why he ran a check on the passenger’s identification, so that the
officer simply appears to be overreaching. The quotations in the last
paragraph (the justification for the stop was “out of the way”) indicate that
the officer knew he was going beyond the scope of a lawful search. The
opinion’s fact section is thus really two stories told at once: a counternarrative of a police officer stopping ordinary drivers for no good reason
and a traditional story of a police officer successfully following his gut.
The second story, however, is suspended during most of this account.
Section 198358 lawsuits, where the plaintiff sues government actors for
a violation of civil rights, may also provide counter-narratives of police
conduct. In these cases, where the plaintiff is often shown to be innocent of
any criminal activity, the officer is not vindicated by the results of the
search or detention of the plaintiff. Thus, a story of ordinary people and
police aggression can be more easily told. In § 1983 cases, the issue often
boils down to qualified immunity, which requires a determination of
whether the officer violated clearly established constitutional rights.59 A
57

Id. at 1613 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) [https://perma.cc/C7V7-APAU].
59
“Governmental actors are ‘shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”’
‘[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law’ at the time of an incident provided ‘fair
58
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recent U.S. Supreme Court § 1983 decision tells a story of excessive force,
and possibly biased policing, where an officer assumes that a young man
and his parents are lying to him.60
The story took place at 2:00 a.m. in Bellaire, Texas.61 Officer Edwards
saw a black Nissan SUV park in front of a house and two men get out.62
The officer incorrectly typed the license plate number into his computer
and the incorrect number matched a stolen vehicle of the same make and
model.63 The officer decided to confront the two men:
Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and ordered Tolan and
Cooper to the ground. He accused Tolan and Cooper of having stolen the car.
Cooper responded, “That’s not true.” And Tolan explained, “That’s my car.”
Tolan then complied with the officer’s demand to lie face-down on the
home’s front porch.
As it turned out, Tolan and Cooper were at the home where Tolan lived with
his parents. Hearing the commotion, Tolan’s parents exited the front door in
their pajamas. In an attempt to keep the misunderstanding from escalating
into something more, Tolan’s father instructed Cooper to lie down, and
instructed Tolan and Cooper to say nothing. Tolan and Cooper then remained
facedown.
Edwards told Tolan’s parents that he believed Tolan and Cooper had stolen
the vehicle. In response, Tolan’s father identified Tolan as his son, and
Tolan’s mother explained that the vehicle belonged to the family and that no
crime had been committed. Tolan’s father explained, with his hands in the
air, “[T]his is my nephew. This is my son. We live here. This is my house.”
Tolan’s mother similarly offered, “[S]ir this is a big mistake. This car is not
stolen. . . . That’s our car.”64

The parents’ pleas are ignored, however, and the story continues:
While Tolan and Cooper continued to lie on the ground in silence, Edwards
radioed for assistance. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived on
the scene and drew his pistol. Edwards told Cotton that Cooper and Tolan
had exited a stolen vehicle. Tolan’s mother reiterated that she and her
husband owned both the car Tolan had been driving and the home where
these events were unfolding. Cotton then ordered her to stand against the
family’s garage door. In response to Cotton’s order, Tolan’s mother asked,
“[A]re you kidding me? We’ve lived her[e] 15 years. We’ve never had
anything like this happen before.”
The parties disagree as to what happened next. . . .

warning’ to the defendants ‘that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.
Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curium) (alterations in original) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739,
741 (2002)) (citations omitted) [https://perma.cc/6UC6-64L4].
60
Id. at 1863–64.
61
Id. at 1863.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1863 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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....
Both parties agree [however] that Tolan then exclaimed, from roughly 15 to
20 feet away, “[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” The parties also
agree that Cotton then drew his pistol and fired three shots at Tolan. Tolan
and his mother testified that these shots came with no verbal warning. One of
the bullets entered Tolan’s chest, collapsing his right lung and piercing his
liver. While Tolan survived, he suffered a life-altering injury that disrupted
his budding professional baseball career and causes him to experience pain
on a daily basis.65

This story is one of an ordinary family surprised by an officer’s
incorrect accusation, made at the point of a gun, and the officer’s obtuse
refusal to hear their explanation. Certain details humanize the family, such
as the image of the parents in their pajamas—the father with his hands in
the air—while it is the police who appear dangerous and out of control.
A very different version of these events, one favorable to police, was
told by the court of appeals in this same case:
Officer Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and flashlight,
identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Robbie Tolan and Cooper
to “come here”. When Robbie Tolan and Cooper cursed Officer Edwards and
refused to comply, Officer Edwards stated to them his belief the black
Nissan was stolen and ordered them onto the ground.
Shortly thereafter, Robbie Tolan’s parents, Bobby and Marian Tolan, exited
the house through the front door. Again, Officer Edwards stated his belief
that Robbie Tolan and Cooper had stolen the Nissan; Robbie Tolan and
Cooper complied with Officer Edwards’ ordering them onto the ground only
after Marian and Bobby Tolan ordered them to do so. . . . Bobby Tolan
yelled at Cooper and Robbie Tolan to stay down; and Marian Tolan walked
repeatedly in front of Officer Edwards’ drawn pistol, insisting no crime had
been committed. Dealing with four people in a chaotic and confusing scene,
Officer Edwards radioed for expedited assistance. Sergeant Cotton
responded and, hearing the tension in Officer Edwards’ voice, believed him
to be in danger.66

This version of the story thus sets the stage for an aggressive police
response:
Upon his arrival, Sergeant Cotton observed: Officer Edwards with pistol
drawn; Bobby Tolan standing to Officer Edwards’ left, next to a sport-utility
vehicle parked in the Tolans’ driveway, where Officer Edwards had ordered
him to stand; Marian Tolan “moving around” in an agitated state in front of
Officer Edwards; and Cooper lying prone. Sergeant Cotton drew his pistol
and moved in to assist. . . .

65
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863–64 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Compare the details of
Tolan’s injuries depicted in the last two sentences with the terse statement in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 375 (2007) (“Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.”).
66
Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 2013).
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....
Sergeant Cotton recognized the immediate need to handcuff and search the
felony suspects, but Marian Tolan’s movement and demeanor frustrated the
Officers’ doing so; . . .
....
Sergeant Cotton’s method of handling Marian Tolan angered Robbie Tolan;
upon seeing his mother pushed into the garage door and hearing a metallic
impact, Robbie Tolan yelled “get your fucking hands off my mom!”, pulled
his outstretched arms to his torso, and began getting up and turning toward
Sergeant Cotton. Fearing Robbie Tolan was reaching towards his waistband
for a weapon, Sergeant Cotton drew his pistol and fired three rounds at
Robbie Tolan, striking him once in the chest and causing serious internal
injury.67

The difference between the two versions is not merely the court of
appeals’ emphasis on what the officer saw and experienced (the two young
men initially cursed and refused to obey orders to get on the ground, and
the parents were arguing with police), but also the way in which the Tolans
are portrayed. In the Supreme Court version, the Tolans are humanized. We
are made very aware of the presence of the parents vouching for their son.
The anger of the young men and the parents is downplayed, while the fact
that they have been stopped just outside their own home only because the
officer decided to run their plates, and did so ineptly, is emphasized. In the
court of appeals version, the Tolans are presented as unreasonably angry
and uncooperative, and therefore potentially dangerous.
Yet although they present very different stories, both narratives, like
most judicial police narratives, give us limited context. The popular police
narrative is that police are always facing danger, and that everyone can be a
threat. Similarly, in opinions, we are often told that encounters take place in
“high crime areas,” with racial implications about the residents.68 In the
Tolan case, for example, the court of appeals tells us there had been many
car burglaries in the area.69 But we learn no additional context that might
give meaning to the reactions of the people they stop.70 Even in the
Supreme Court account of the Tolan shooting, above, there is no indication
why the young men might have been so angry: Were the police known to

67

Id. at 302–03.
“African Americans and Hispanics tend to populate poor, inner city neighborhoods, which are
commonly known to be high crime areas.” Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth
Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 386 (2001) (footnote omitted).
69
713 F.3d 229, 305 (5th Cir. 2013).
70
Although race is not mentioned in the Tolan opinions, The NAACP filed an amicus brief in the
Supreme Court, referring to the role of implicit bias resulting in “unjustified use of lethal force against
young African-American men” and asserting that the victim of the police shooting was AfricanAmerican. Motion of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (No. 13-551)
[https://perma.cc/V3UU-EFXD].
68
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harass people in that neighborhood? Did they routinely run plates for no
reasons? Had the men been stopped for no reason before?
A case from the Washington Supreme Court provides an illustration of
how additional context can change a story significantly. A seventeen-yearold boy was charged and convicted of obstruction of a police officer for his
conduct while police were dealing with his intoxicated sister, “R.”71 The
lower appellate court told the story as follows:
According to Officer Jenkins, “just as things kind of started to settle,” E.J.J.,
R.’s 17-year-old brother, stepped outside of the home and approached R. and
the officers. Officer Jenkins informed E.J.J. that the officers were “in the
middle of an active investigation” and asked him to go back inside the house
and close the door. Although the officer repeated this request “four or five
times,” E.J.J. refused to comply. Indeed, E.J.J. became “hostile” when the
officer made this request. According to Officer Barreto, E.J.J.’s presence
made it “very difficult” to calm his sister, and, as a result of his presence, the
scene “escalated very quickly into a very hostile situation.” Officer Jenkins
similarly testified that, although R. had become calm, she “began to escalate”
when E.J.J. came outside. Officer Jenkins described E.J.J. as “irate” during
this exchange, calling the officers names, yelling, and using profanity. E.J.J.
was advised by the officers that he could be “arrested for obstructing” if he
refused to comply with their orders.
Eventually, Officer Jenkins, without touching E.J.J., escorted him back to the
house. The officer then asked E.J.J. multiple times to close the door to the
house, and E.J.J. repeatedly refused. Several times, Officer Jenkins closed
the door, and E.J.J. reopened it. The home had two doors, an outer “wrought
iron door” that someone inside the home could see through and an inner
“solid door.” Officer Jenkins wanted E.J.J. to close the solid door because,
when only the wrought iron door was closed, E.J.J. “was still able to see
what we were doing.” This concerned the officer because if E.J.J. “chose to
harm us, he’d have the ability to do so without us knowing.”72

The account relies heavily on the officer’s testimony, liberally quoted.
There is some copspeak or jargon: “hostile situation,” “active
investigation,” “began to escalate.” But, most importantly, the account
focuses on the officers’ fear of what the boy might do, based on what
seems to be the boy’s inexplicable rage and rudeness. This court upheld the
conviction.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court. The
majority told the story in this way:
The police . . . escort[ed] R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the
front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew
concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a
nightstick. E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers
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that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The
officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and
instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house.
Initially, E.J.J. did not comply, questioning why he had to return to the
house. When, eventually, he did return to his home, he stood in the open
doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. . . . The
officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to
withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to
supervise the scene from the doorway (10 to 15 feet away from the other
officers and R.J.) to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to
stand behind the closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached
into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At
this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive
names. An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction.
After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under
arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. The entire interaction
lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes.73

This account gives us more from the boy’s perspective. We learn the
important fact that he saw the officer reach for his nightstick, and that he
was trying to make sure the officers did not hurt his sister. The fact that the
boy used profanity is downplayed through its placement near the end of the
paragraph. This story provides some humanity to E.J.J., rather than
presenting him simply as disrespectful, angry, and a potential threat.
But it is the concurring opinion of Justice González that provides the
most radical retelling of the story. Justice González brings in facts about
the police department and national events74 that could help explain, and
even justify, the boy’s actions.
On February 14, 2011, E.J.J.’s mother called the police to assist her family in
crisis. E.J.J.’s younger sister was intoxicated and breaking windows. The
police responded and intervened. E.J.J., 17 years old at the time, saw one
officer raise his nightstick as the police tried to subdue his sister. E.J.J. was
concerned for his sister’s welfare and let the police know he was watching.
E.J.J. and one officer called each other names. An officer ordered E.J.J. to
retreat to his house. At first E.J.J. refused, but ultimately he acceded. Once
inside, E.J.J. asserted his right to watch the police from inside his own home.
He refused an unlawful order to close his own door. He refused to turn away.
For this, he was arrested, charged, and convicted. (If this is typical of the
cases for which King County wants to build a new youth jail, perhaps the
community opposition is understandable.)
. . . [T]his case is about Liberty in context. The real context is not
subsequent events in Missouri or New York. The context is that E.J.J. is a
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young black man in a city where the police have been found by the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) to use excessive force against nonviolent
black youth, especially when intoxication or mental health issues are
involved, and that the charge of obstruction is used against black defendants
disproportionately. Even if the officers who responded to E.J.J.’s family that
night are unfairly painted by the DOJ’s brush, E.J.J. had cause to be
concerned for his sister and a right to observe, especially from inside his own
home.75

In footnotes, Justice González described the police killings of
unarmed black men that had been in the news, as well as the local
community opposition to the city’s plans to build additional juvenile
detention space, opposition based on a sense that too many children of
color were being funneled into the justice system.76 He also noted a recent
federal investigation of the Seattle Police Department’s use of force:
In its exhaustive investigation of the Seattle Police Department (SPD), the
DOJ found that “among the 76 ‘obstruction only’ charges [filed in 2008],
51% involved Black individuals.” Though this alone should be cause for
grave concern given that African Americans make up about 7 percent of
Seattle’s population, it is especially alarming when coupled with the fact that
more than half of all incidents involving excessive or unreasonable uses of
force by the SPD involved nonwhite subjects.77

Many readers may find this to be too much context. They may object
that these additional facts about controversies national and local should not
affect the evaluation of the boy’s conduct or that of these police officers.
They might fear that such an approach to the facts of criminal cases could
excuse all kinds of bad behavior, and that no matter what might be going
on in the world, individuals should obey police orders. Certainly this kind
of “context” is not what we are used to in appellate fact statements.
Yet, it is common to see other kinds of context in judicial opinions:
that the area where the incident occurred is a high-crime area, for example,
or that weapons are common, or other general facts about suspected
criminals that officers have learned through “training and experience.” This
context that supports the police narrative is rarely questioned.
This other context, however—the facts that citizens know or have
heard about the police—is as relevant as the facts that police know or have
heard about the citizens whom they are policing. The relevance of what
citizens know about police in a particular neighborhood can also come up
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in the context of search and seizure law. In Illinois v. Wardlow,78 the
majority held in 2000 that a defendant’s flight, in a high-crime Chicago
neighborhood, upon seeing police, could justify an investigative stop
leading to arrest.79 Dissenting in part, Justice Stevens noted that among
those residing in high crime areas, “there is also the possibility that the
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification,
believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any
criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For such a
person, unprovoked flight is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’”80 Writing
well before the videos of recent years that showed unprovoked police
shootings, or the revelations about police torture of minority men in
Chicago,81 Justice Stevens stated, “evidence supporting the reasonableness
of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too
persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive.”82
Because this context does not fit easily into the police narrative that
we are accustomed to, it may feel wrong, or at least surprising. But just as
the videos of police shootings of unarmed civilians require white viewers to
rethink their assumptions about police conduct, additional context about
community–police relations can encourage courts to hesitate before
imposing the default police narrative upon the facts of a case.
CONCLUSION
The police narrative, favoring the police perspective, is prevalent in
appellate court decisions. The stories are formed by decisions about
language, point of view, detail, and context. Such stories are not necessarily
false or misleading, but legal writers and readers should be aware that they
are a kind of narrative argument. We should recognize the possibility of
alternative narratives, from different points of view and with different
context. The purpose of this essay has been to highlight some of the key
features of the police narrative as well as the occasional counter-narrative.
In an age when police stories are under increasing scrutiny outside the
courtroom, legal writers and readers need to be aware of the power of these
narratives and to understand their choices in presenting a narrative of the
facts.
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